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Abstract 
The Psagot judgment, handed down by the European Court of Justice (CJEU) in 2019, provides that 
products originating in Israeli settlements in territories Israel occupied during regional wars, 
exported to the EU, should be labelled as such, to allow consumers make an informed political choice. 
This article argues that the Psagot judgment thus reinforces normative, 'top-down' governmental 
power with soft, 'bottom-up' consumer power. Psagot's implications for Israel-EU relations is 
discussed along with the effectiveness of the EU approach in the short and longer terms. 
Keywords: Psagot, EU, Israel, Normative Power, Consumer Protection, Corporate Responsibility 
Introduction 
The Psagot judgment (CJEU, 2019) is the latest link in a long chain of EU measures 
aimed at excluding the territories occupied by Israel during regional wars (hereafter: 
'the territories') from the Israel-EU Association Agreement's scope (European Union, 
2000).1 The judgment broadly interprets the labelling requirement included in EU 
Regulation 1169/2011 (European Union, 2011) aimed at consumer protection, to 
include political and ethical information. Consequently, it provides for the labelling of 
products originating in Israeli settlements as such. Compared to former EU measures 
regarding the territories and CJEU's Brita judgment (CJEU, 2010), Psagot judgment 
marks a partial shift of decision and implementation power from the governmental and 
institutional 'top-down' sphere to the private 'bottom-up' sphere of individual 
consumers (Sitbon, 2020). This article examines to what extent CJEU's perception 
underlying the Psagot judgment is compatible with the Normative Power and Soft 
Power theories, discussing its implications for Israel-EU relations. It further assesses 
the effectiveness of this CJEU/EU's approach in the short and the long run. 
 





Normative Power Europe 
The notion of power is essential to international diplomacy. International players, 
states, international organizations, multinational corporations2, or regional alliances 
such as the EU, try to change the attitude of other international players, to make them 
adopt their positions, or positions serving their interests best, sharing their ideas, 
values, behaviours, and cultures. Nye (2009, 160) mentions three basic ways to do this: 
coercion and payment ('hard power') and attraction ('soft power') . 
Normative power is a form of soft power, based mainly upon the use of conceptual 
justifications. It is exercised by the formation, implementation, and enforcement of 
legal norms. An entity acting as a normative power seeks to project its norms into the 
international system (De Zutter, 2010). Deviation from these norms might be subject 
to sanctions.  
François Duchêne (1972, 1973) suggests that by using progressive civilian power, based 
on economic, diplomatic, and cultural measures rather than traditional military power, 
Europe can lead towards peaceful international relations. Some scholars (e.g., Hill, 
1993, 318-2; Smith, 2000, 15-9) doubt Duchêne's observation.3 The enhancement of 
European influence over the international order after the formation of the EU triggered 
the development of the term "Normative Power", which added a cognitive and 
sociological dimension to the traditional institutional discourse in International 
Relations. Normative power refers to the EU's ability to exert its ideological influence 
and to diffuse its laudable values and standards (e.g., Cardwell & Wessel, 2020, 13-15) 
across the international community. Sometimes other forms of soft power, such as 
cultural diffusion, policies, and institutionalized dialogue complement it (Manners, 
2002, 235-58).  
In light of criticisms regarding the lack of conceptual precision (e.g., Forsberg, 2011), 
scholars aimed to fine-tune the "Normative Power" theory, viewing it as an analytical 
ideal type that can be streamlined into two groups: (1) its normative basis and (2) its 
normative practice. Kienzle (2014) adds another indication: its potential impact. Our 
analysis will examine these aspects. Menon et al. (2004, 11) describe the EU as one of 
the “most formidable machines for managing differences peacefully ever invented.” 
Manners (2002) contends that the EU's power capacities emanate from its position in 
the global economy, its population, and broad membership. Maull (2005) stresses its 
force in international politics, consisting of its economic attraction, political success, 
and wealth. 
In the global arena, the EU shifted from “physical impositions of imperialism” in the 
past to setting “world standards by normative terms” (Rosecrance, 1998, 22). It strives 
to establish and preserve its position as “a major normative and civilian power, playing 
a significant role in the areas of humanitarian aid, environmental sustainability, 
multilateralism, human rights, and development, among other things.” (Davis Cross, 
2013, 1). The EU's norm-driven practices aim to enhance an observably distinct 
behaviour in world politics (Manners, 2002), shaping the will of the power-recipients 
 
2 The realization of increased power exerted by multinational corporations (Strange, 1991) was developed in later 
literature (E.g. Babic et al., 2017). 
3 EU's global political effect was alternatively described as soft imperialism, superpower, civilian power, good 
citizens Europe and ethical power Europe (De Zutter, 2010). 
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(Galtung, 1973, 36), simultaneously strengthening the EU's security and comparative 
advantage in the world economy through this process (De Zutter, 2010). 
The "Normative Power Europe" perception has been criticized in several theoretical 
respects. Neo-realists exposed its utopian and overly immaterial aspect in light of the 
reality on the ground (Whitman, 2011). Pragmatists argue that the EU's trade policy 
usually reflects a selective imposition of Normative Power vis-à-vis developing 
countries, shaped and influenced by pressures of organized groups and their economic 
interests (Poletti and Sicurelli, 2018). Some describe the "Normative Power Europe" 
as an empire, emphasizing the unequal power relations which the EU maintains with 
its neighbours. This approach helps in explaining controversial EU politics concerning 
authoritarian regimes (Del Sarto, 2016). 
Scholars have demonstrated the vital link between the EU's normative power and its 
international image, enhanced by its use of soft power and ethical positions (e.g. 
Smith (2006, 22, 27). However, others (e.g., Pace, 2009) question the EU's self-image 
of promoting democracy in light of its actual practice concerning non-EU 
Mediterranean countries. 
The EU's Normative Power in the Mediterranean Context 
The Venice Declaration (European Commission, 1980) reflects the EU's determination 
to play a meaningful role in the Mediterranean region, working 'in a more concrete way 
towards peace' (Art. 2) based on 'principles universally accepted by the international 
community' (Art. 4). In recent years, this desire has been reinforced by the ongoing 
stagnation in the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, the continued 
expansion of the population in the settlements beyond the pre-1967 borders, and the 
Israeli conflict management policy associated with it, all of which have increased 
European frustration. Manners (2002, 244-245) suggests that the EU's normative 
power is exercised, among other ways, by transference – diffusion taking place when 
the EU exchanges goods, trade, aid or technical assistance with third parties, including 
what he calls "carrot and stickism" of financial rewards and economic sanctions. 
The EU is Israel's major trading partner. 4 Israel desires to deepen its integration with 
the EU. In the EU leadership's eyes, these facts constitute significant leverage over 
Israeli public opinion, facilitating the exercise of "carrot and sticks" to strengthen and 
enhance the policy of differentiation between Israel and the territories.5 Association 
agreements serve as legal platforms by which the EU exports its legal norms (Oliviera, 
2015, 7). Beginning with the Venice Declaration (European Union, 1980), and even 
more since the Oslo process in the mid-1990s, the EU has been trying to impose its 
view on Israel, regarding the Israeli-Palestinian territories' political dispute. The 
conclusion of the EU-Israel Association Agreement (1995) and EU-PLO Association 
Agreement (1997) enhanced this process, encouraging the exclusion of goods 
originating in the Occupied Territories from the former's scope.  
 
4 Annual trade flows between Israel and the EU in 2019 exceeded 45bn $, about one third of Israel's entire 
international trade. For comparison, in 2019 Israel's trade with the US amounted to 27.7 bn$ and with China to 
11.2 bn $ (Israeli CBS, 2020). 
5 Other possible steps include restricted European cooperation with Israeli banks operating in the settlements; 
Reducing tax benefits for European organizations which support the settlements; Revocation of the validity of 





During this time, the EU used different soft power techniques to affect Israel's position 
regarding the regional conflict: 
1. Political Dialogue 
Soft power is about convincing, about getting other countries to want what a country 
wants. (Nye, 1990; 2004; 2009, 161). A dialogue facilitates 'persuading others,' 
'invoking norms' agreed by the parties in mutual agreements, discussing 'what is 
normal,' and exercising 'the power of example' (Frosberg, 2011, 1196-1198).  
Article 3 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement provides for an ongoing political 
dialogue between its parties. The political dialogue regarding the territories' dispute 
has had its ups and downs. In the Oslo process (1993-1996), Israel and EU positions 
were arguably most aligned. Though the Oslo process stuttered in the late 1990s (under 
the first Netanyahu government), under Barak's government (1999-2001), Israel 
accepted Clinton Parameters of 2000 (i.e., agreeing to a Palestinian state in most of 
the Gaza Strip's territory and the West Bank, with a Palestinian capital in East 
Jerusalem). While Israel's military actions in response to the Second Intifada attracted 
much EU criticism, in 2003 Israeli PM Sharon's government accepted the EU-backed 
Roadmap. In 2008, during the Annapolis talks, Israeli PM Olmert proposed a 
Palestinian state in territories equivalent to 100% of the Gaza Strip and West Bank. In 
2009 even Israeli PM Netanyahu accepted the two-state principle in his Bar Ilan 
speech. However, his government's positions in recent years have exacerbated the 
differences between Israel and the EU concerning the territories' status. Furthermore, 
Israel's continuous settlement construction in the territories has undermined the EU's 
faith in the Israeli commitment to the two-state solution, arguably rendering this 
solution considerably less feasible. Consequently, the EU realized that a political 
dialogue alone would not suffice to change the Israeli position. 
2. The Brita Judgment: From Dialogue to "Top-Down" Legal Action 
The 2010 Brita case marked a deviation from a mere political dialogue between Israel 
and the EU. It enabled the CJEU to impose the EU's normative power on Israel, using 
legal interpretation, judgment, and enforcement – embedded within this highly-
conflicted political context, implying an economic threat to certain Israeli activities in 
the territories. This judgment deprived goods originating in the Occupied Territories 
of the EU-Israel Association Agreement's benefits, contending that they should be 
covered by the EU-PLO Agreement (CJEU, 2010, paras. 43-53).  
This judgment invited criticism (e.g. Pardo and Zemer, 2011, Munin, 2011, 2013) and 
anger in Israeli public opinion. EU measures that followed it were perceived as 
sanctions, although the EU stressed that these are not sanctions according to public 
international law. These measures caused economic losses to Israeli businesses in the 
territories. Some companies moved their operations into the 1967 borders to avoid 
them. Nevertheless, Israel's approach towards the territories did not change. 
3. The Psagot Judgment: Combining "Top-Down" and "Bottom-Up" 
Pressures 
As Brita's strategy did not deliver the desired results, the Psagot judgement marks an 
EU attempt to reinforce the "top-down" normative power with "bottom-up," "local 
power" pressure. The growing importance of the "power of local" in international 
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diplomacy is broadly acknowledged (e.g. Diez, 2013). Gordon and Pardo (2015) 
identify its contribution in the context of the Occupied Territories. Such civic activism 
reinforces the EU's normative power, as individuals and domestic courts in EU 
member states take advantage of the EU's legal system to promote their agendas, thus 
strengthening the EU's legal system (De Witte et al., 2016) 6  circumventing the 
reluctance of governments to enforce EU law due to political and other considerations.  
De Zutter (2010) suggests that normative power consists of four elements: a political 
entity exercising "power" emanating from its "presence"; others recognize and confirm 
the normative power and its norms; consequently, an impact on the others is obtained. 
Forsberg (2009) contends that normative power involves: (1) a normative identity; (2) 
normative interests; (3) practice according to norms; (4) a normative means of power; 
and (5) normative ends. 
As in Brita, in Psagot a political entity, the EU, exercises "power", using consumer 
protection regulation to make a political point. It draws on a normative basis: EU law, 
enshrining EU's normative identity and interests and reinforcing public international 
law rules. Its implementation forms the normative practice. Psagot judgment reflects 
and applies the EU's normative means of power (i.e., warning EU consumers that 
products originating in 'Israeli Settlements' in the territories, thus potentially affecting 
their consumption), striving towards the normative end of ending the Israeli-
Palestinian regional dispute. The open question is whether, or to what extent, other 
international players will recognize and confirm this move and what impact it might 
have. 
Simultaneously, the Psagot judgment illustrates complementary "local powers" 
contributions, both in Israel and in the EU, reinforcing the evolving top-down 
treatment of the territories' dispute between Israel and the EU:  
Israeli "local powers" have initiated the Psagot case: i.e., the Psagot winery owners 
who explicitly declared their aim to challenge France's labelling requirements not only 
on business grounds but also on political grounds. The Israeli government did not 
support their initiative. On the contrary: the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
concerned of the broad potential political consequences of such a judgment, asked 
them to withdraw their claim, but they refused to do so. They activated France's 
domestic court, which referred an interpretative question to the CJEU, and applied the 
latter's interpretation of EU law to the case before it. The French court's reference 
triggered an interpretation of EU law that was unknown before and is now mandatory 
in all member states.  
The Psagot judgment's interpretation of EU regulation 1169/2011 empowers EU 
consumers' "local power". By endorsing considerations that take into account 
bottom-up ethical consumerism, the EU seems to deviate, for the first time in this 
context, from its conventional top-down approach towards the Israeli-Palestinian 
issue. This civic bottom-up pressure adds an essential complementary component to 
the EU's political top-down leverage in the region, broadening the traditional concept 
that normative power emanates from the academic and political elite (Hopf 1998).  
 
6 A major shortcoming of this method is the limited scope of CJEU discussion, which prevents the formation of an 





By shifting the decision power partly to consumers, the Psagot judgment may trigger 
another sphere of dialogue with Israel, held by the civil society, added to that held by 
decision-makers. It may further contribute to the internal EU dialogue between top-
down and bottom-up players (e.g., Berkhout et al, 2018). It suggests measurable, 
broader scale "objective" indication to consumers' opinion (bottom-up), which may 
help EU's decision-makers in designing future policy (top-down) towards the 
territories, according to the formers' expectations. 
The success of the "power of local" or bottom-up strategy depends on the visibility of 
normative fiats (Gorson, 2002), including the resistance emerging 'from the local 
arena upon which the EU wishes to impose its normative stance' (Gordon and Pardo, 
2015). In the Psagot case, visibility is obtained in four dimensions: in the judgment 
itself; in the Israeli political and public resistance (e.g., Eichner, 2020); in the labelling, 
a constant reminder of this issue to any potential consumer in the EU; and in the 
"tailwind" the judgment gives to future actions by European civil society actors, willing 
to resist Israel's control of the territories. The success of top-down and/or bottom-up 
normative power interference to achieve political goals depends on its broadly 
recognized legitimacy and credibility. Psagot's bottom-up approach builds on a 
strong anchor of global legitimacy credibility: consumer ethics. 
Ethics seems to be a vital component of the "ideal type" perception of normative power, 
although the concept of the 'ethical power' of the EU is still not well developed (Kienzle, 
2014). Globally, labelling claims are often made in the context of ethical criteria, such 
as sustainability, environmental protection, animal welfare, or labour conditions 
(Vergano, 2019). However, Psagot's approach builds on a broader phenomenon: the 
gradually changing social expectations of business corporations, beginning in the late 
1990s, and the increasing recurring demands of post-materialist Western consumers 
that corporate business decisions will consider non-economic considerations, 
including ethics and human rights issues. NGOs and social movements, operating 
transnationally (known as the "Global Civil society") invoke these demands. They enjoy 
social trust and standing, enabling them to determine the ethical standards expected 
from corporations. The internet and social networks equip these organizations with 
unprecedented oversight, enabling quick, inexpensive, and substantial exposure to 
controversial corporate practices. This reality forces business leaders to consider 
broader public concerns regarding their companies' negative social externalities and 
address the "courts of public opinion" rather than merely the profit bottom line.7 
However, the EU's material position seems to suffer some severe weaknesses in 
uniform position, legitimacy, consistency, and narrative. Such imperfections could 
undermine the international players' and the public's support the EU anticipates.  
Uniform Position: Speaking in One Voice 
Davis Cross (2013, 2-3) writes that the EU 'continually under performs when it comes 
to soft power' as a result of its weak and often negative external image. The EU is more 
robust when it can present a united front. Unfortunately, this is not always the case 
(Toje, 2008, 126-7).  
Since the beginning of the dispute between Israel and the EU regarding the territories, 
the EU has by and large succeeded in maintaining an external united front (despite 
 
7 For further discussion see Sitbon, 2020. 
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internal nuances) (Wojnarowicz and Zaręba, 2020) and a uniform position. Legally, 
the Psagot judgment reinforces this uniformity by determining a uniformly binding 
legal interpretation to EU Regulation 1169/2011. However, politically some EU 
members expressed their dissatisfaction with mandatory labelling of territories' 
products.8 
Legitimacy: Does the EU Protect Universally Agreed Norms? 
Inclusiveness and legitimacy may be obtained by disseminating norms which are 
broadly recognized as "good" (Kienzle, 2014), or "cosmopolitan" norms (Beck, 2003). 
The CJEU tries to establish such legitimacy in the Brita and Psagot judgments, relying 
on international law (Forsberg, 2011). However, '[t]here is always a risk that actors will 
follow their interests even if they know that this may harm others' (Sjursen, 2006). 
Moreover, the most powerful are suspected for using a "moral" foreign policy for their 
interest, even when they don't (Eriksen, 2003). Deviating from the ethical ideal-type 
of cosmopolitan normative power, De Zutter (2010) suggests that the norms diffused 
by a normative power are not, by definition, universal. She stresses that the 
universality of norms depends, among other things, on their implementation, on the 
historical context, and on the ongoing global debates at the time of their diffusion.  
In cases where there is no international agreement on a norm’s essence, a question 
arises whether the EU is capable of, and entitled to, shaping the concept of what is 
"normal" in this regard. Those who answer negatively may see the EU's normative 
power exercise as a simple expression of Eurocentric cultural imperialism (Sejurn, 
2006). 
Article 31(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, entitled 'General 
rule of interpretation,' provides that to interpret a treaty such as the EU-Israel 
Association Agreement, 'any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties' shall be taken into account, together with the context. 
The Psagot judgment relies on what the EU portrays as universal norms supported by 
UN and ICJ decisions.9 In this sense, it continues a line of reasoning used in Venice 
Declaration and the Brita judgment. 10 Does the CJEU imply that these non-mandatory 
decisions and declarations, accepted in a highly political context, create or reflect 'rules' 
in the sense of Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention11, or alternatively could this reference 
be interpreted as implying a new customary law rule? Under the current 
circumstances, such implications are far-reaching. Failure to establish both these legal 
assumptions may undermine the entire legal basis for the EU's position. 
 
8 Greece and Germany expressed such opinions in 2015 (Weinreb, 2015 ). Czechia, Hungary, Lithuania and the 
Netherlands - later. (Ahren, 2019). 
9 See decisions specified in the CJEU judgment, para. 53 and AG Hogan's opinion footnote 26.  
10 Art. 3 of Venice Declaration (EU Commission, 1980, Art. 3) specifies the UN documents on which it relies as 
justification.  
11 In Brita the CJEU (para. 56) provides: 'a settlement established in breach of the rules of international 
humanitarian law may be the subject of ethical assessments capable of influencing consumers’ purchasing 
decisions, particularly since some of those rules constitute fundamental rules of international law (Advisory 
Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 9 July 2004, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136, paragraphs 155 to 159).' [Emphasis added]. The 
rules cited in this Opinion establish the right for self determination. However, the interpretative assessment that 
follows, implying that the Israeli treatment of the territories breaches this right is of an advisory, not mandatory 






In reality, the CJEU's interpretation of these norms, or their application to the 
territories, is not necessarily accepted as universal, even by the EU itself. While the 
EU's policy towards the territories is justified, among other things, on the grounds of 
public international law alleged infringement, the EU does not seem to apply the same 
approach towards some 150 other territories, which are suffering a disputed public 
international law status, some within the EU (e.g., North Cyprus, Ceuta, and Melilla) 
(The Jerusalem Center, 2020).12 Lack of inclusiveness and coherence could undermine 
the legitimacy and reliability of the EU's approach, both internationally13 and locally.  
Narrative 
Nye (2009, 161) writes: 'In today's information age, success is the result not merely of 
whose army wins but also of whose story wins.' Convincingness depends, to a great 
extent, on the narrative. Narratives are the stories of 'the temporal character of human 
experience' (Ricoeur, 1984, 52) communicated in different ways, including the popular 
media, outreach programs, etc. (Ociepka, 2013). In many cases, narratives underline 
norms' essence and help to establish their public legitimacy. 
The ongoing Israel-EU dispute over the international status of the territories reflects a 
clash of political views, a conflict of narratives. The Psagot judgment, its coverage in 
the media, and its practical effect, partly shifting the decision to the "power of local" 
may determine whose story will win in the medium and long run. It may demonstrate 
the cruciality of the foreign public's perceptions of determining state behaviour and 
outcomes in international relations (Davis Cross, 2013, 5).  
The clash between the parties' stories reflects the differences in their international and 
local interests, but also their desired global statuses, backed by their stories: the 
Palestinian narrative portrays them as victims, deprived of their land and 
independence, with Israel described as a settler-colonial state. It aims to draw global 
support to their territorial and political claim and set forth an independent state. The 
EU's narrative focuses on supporting its desired international image as a global player: 
A global guardian of public international law rules and fundamental rights of the 
Palestinians, while simultaneously recognizing the legitimate Israeli concerns.  
In recent decades, right-wing Israeli leaders face intense domestic pressure to continue 
their current hawkish policy regarding the territories. This internal political need 
collides with Israel's desired external image as an advocate of international law rules, 
respecting globally recognized fundamental rights and values. As a small country 
situated in an unfriendly neighbourhood, Israel depends on global, economic, and 
political support, particularly from the US, its major political ally, and the EU, its major 
trade partner. Obtaining this support depends on maintaining a positive external 
image. 
 
12 CJEU's approach to the concept of 'territory' in international law was criticized (Cardwell and Wessel, 2020, pp. 
21-23; Kanevskaia, 2020). Kuchenbecker and Tucker (2019) suggest that ‘if EU law would be interpreted as 
requiring that all perceived violations of international law must be addressed by product labeling, it would be a 
vastly complex commercial disaster.'  
13 The United States, for example, found this decision biased against Israel. (Schneider, 2019).  
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Torn between these two conflicting narratives, Israel is well aware of the narrative's 
importance and the importance of its global acceptance. Thus, Israel invests energy in 
explaining that its presence in the territories is compatible with these globally agreed 
values and rules externally. 14  The EU's narrative, substantially supporting the 
Palestinian narrative, competes with the Israeli narrative to gain the global public's 
support. 
Reeves (2004) differentiates between the narrative and the plot, contending that the 
plot is visible while the narrative is hidden. In the Brita and Psagot cases, the wording 
of the legal norms at stake allows for conflicting interpretations. The legal, allegedly 
"technical" reasoning - the "plot" – focuses on consumer protection in Psagot and on 
rules of origin in Brita. In both judgments, the CJEU opts for the "plot" serving the EU 
narrative and its political goals. 
While politicians and courts may consciously use narratives as leverages to promote 
agendas, individuals may be strongly affected by them to change their behaviour. In 
this sense, the EU's approach towards the territories may encourage a civil agenda 
which will reinforce EU members' cohesion (Keohane, 2002). Naomi Klein (1999) 
demonstrated in her classical book No Logo that narratives play an essential role in a 
commercial context, as corporations conceal the poor production conditions of well-
known brands, while civil society organizations strive to expose these conditions to 
raise consumers' awareness and trigger (market) pressure on the corporations to 
change their behaviour.  
Partisans of Israel's boycotting, mainly among the Boycott, Divest, Sanction movement 
(BDS) campaign activists, often evoke the commercial boycott of South Africa, which 
was an essential factor leading to the collapse of Apartheid, as a model of economic 
pressure that could encourage Israeli withdrawal from the territories. In Psagot, 
Advocate General Hogan explicitly adopts this analogy, integrating it with the official 
EU narrative, directly addressing consumers (CJEU, 2019, para. 51). 
The similarities drawn between Israel's control of the West Bank and Apartheid in 
South Africa include application of different laws for Israeli settlers and Palestinians 
and other terms of access to water and roads.15 Nonetheless, there are essential flaws 
in this comparison, which AG Hogan ignored, perhaps because they could undermine 
this comparison and thus harm the EU's narrative: 
• The historical context of the dispute (e.g., Kuchenbecker and Tucker, 2019, 5-6) 
implies a different international status for each of the "territories". 
• Legitimate Israeli security concerns due to ongoing Palestinian hostilities made 
Israel stop the territories' withdrawal according to the 1993 and 1995 Oslo 
Agreements; 
• The Palestinian Authority effectively controls the daily lives of 98% of 
Palestinians living in the West Bank;  
•  Israel is singled out although the gravity of its practices is immeasurably 
smaller than many other occupying countries.  
 
14 For example, the Levy Commission Report on the Legal Status of Building in Judea and Samaria (Levy 2012) 
established the legality of Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria according to public international law.  





These differences may explain the CJEU judges' refrainment from explicitly 
mentioning the comparison to South African Apartheid in the Psagot judgment. 
However, one can never know to what extent AG Hogan's use of this analogy 
substantially inspired their final decision. Brita's legal discourse and AG Hogan's 
analysis in Psagot, can enhance and strengthen this inaccurate analogy among 
consumer activists. In the end, it is all about "framing" (Lakoff et al., 2004), i.e., the 
persuasive use of political metaphors. 
Assessment of Potential Impact 
Cross Davis (2013, 5) notes the mutual feedback between the external audience's 
positive approach towards the diffused norms and the diffusing government. If this 
assessment is correct, a positive national and international response to the labelling of 
products originating in the territories may encourage this EU policy. 
Baum and Potter (2019) believe that social media erodes the democratic publics' ability 
to constrain foreign policy by making it harder for citizens to informationally "catch 
up." In the Psagot judgment, the CJEU created an ongoing robust reminding 
mechanism, inviting consumers to reflect on the territories dispute and take a stand 
regarding the narrative with every product's choice. 
Manners (2002, 242, 244) identifies five "core" EU norms: peace, liberty, democracy, 
the rule of law, and respect of human rights. Their reinforcement and expansion 'allows 
the EU to present and legitimate itself as being more than the sum of its parts.' 
[Original emphasis]. According to the EU, Israel's presence in the territories challenges 
all these norms. The EU's current policy continuation thus runs down to the core of its 
raison d'etre. Hitherto the EU has restricted its policy primarily to the declarative 
sphere: the CJEU ensures that the EU's international image would not imply its 
pragmatic international responsibility (Hommelbrunner, 2019, 787), leaving to its 
leaders the necessary flexibility and discretion.16 These may be affected by global and 
local public opinion. 
In the meantime, the Psagot judgment's approach is not necessarily acceptable to a 
broad range of other countries, particularly the US.17  
Narratives, positions, and perceptions change over time.18 Interpretation of the rules 
of origin for products originating in the territories according to EU-Israel trade 
agreements changed over time19. It might change again in the future if reality - or the 
EU's political position - changes.20 Israel's recent peace agreements with some Muslim 
 
16 See, e.g., discussion on stricter options of interpretation to international law in this context. (Ryngaert, 2019). 
17 The US criticized it as creating an 'anti-Israel bias'. (Ortagus, 2019) Decision makers in the US assessed that this 
EU position could have negative implications on US-EU trade relations. (San Diego Jewish World, 2019).  
18 US's President Donald Trump considerably changed US's position to support Israel's position regarding the 
ongoing regional conflict, compared to his predecessors.  
19 From 1975 to mid-1990's the West Bank, the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, before Israel 
withdrew it, enjoyed the benefits of Israel-EU Free Trade Area agreement without reservation of the Palestinian 
people or of the EU. This interpretation served the Palestinian economic interest, and the EU's political interest. 
The conclusion of EU-PLO Association Agreement (EU, 1997), created for the Palestinians a legal alternative 
conduit, through which their exported products to the EU could enjoy trade benefits, allowing them to replace 
their pragmatic, approach with a politically challenging approach, supported by the EU. 
20 De Zutter (2010) indicates that the dynamism of EU norms undermines any search for any fixed and eternal set 
of norms for a normative power. 
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states (the UAE, Bahrein, Morocco, Sudan) may encourage such a change in the long 
run.  
However, more Psagot-like decisions may carry a psychological impact on European 
public opinion, which is more mindful of the human rights discourse. It may even 
bolster the so-called "Silent Boycott" – the resolution of more and more businesses in 
the EU to "have no dealings" with Israel, without publicly voicing an opinion (Koren, 
2015). The small Israeli market, highly dependent on imports and exports, forming 
almost 60% of its GDP (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2020), and on foreign 
investments, may be Israel's 'Achilles' Hill.21 (Kofman, 2014). Other sectors, such as 
Israeli academia, heavily dependent on Israel-EU cooperation agreements, might also 
be affected.  
Conclusion 
The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 triggered the development and application of the 
soft power theory, which closely links with globalization. Some believe that soft power 
loses its strength in the current reality, where countries withdraw back into 
nationalism (Li, 2018). The Psagot judgment proves that it may be too early to rule out 
the effect of soft power, despite the drawbacks of the EU's strategy, noted above. The 
combination of normative power and bottom-up local power may change the game 
rules, potentially adversely affecting European politicians' and corporations' 
approaches towards Israel. 
While it seems unlikely that this new combination of power will change Israel's 
position towards the territories, it burdens the Israeli campaign: in addition to 
convincing decision-makers, through legal and political discourse, Israel has to 
convince public opinion. The battlefield may now move to social networks or the streets 
and stores. If, in the medium and long term, the Palestinians'/EU's narrative achieves 
a broader global effect, Israel may be forced to reconsider its strategy, to avoid severe 
economic and political damage. Such a shift in Israel's position would mark the success 
of the EU's soft power approach. 
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